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ABSTRACT
Java Design Pattern Obfuscation
by Praneeth Kumar Gone
Software Reverse Engineering (SRE) consists of analyzing the design and imple-
mentation of software. Typically, we assume that the executable file is available, but
not the source code. SRE has many legitimate uses, including analysis of software
when no source code is available, porting old software to a modern programming
language, and analyzing code for security vulnerabilities. Attackers also use SRE to
probe for weaknesses in closed-source software, to hack software activation mecha-
nisms (or otherwise change the intended function of software), to cheat at games,
etc.
There are many tools available to aid the aspiring reverse engineer. For example,
there are several tools that recover design patterns from Java byte code or source code.
In this project, we develop and analyze a technique to obfuscate design patterns. We
show that our technique can defeat design pattern detection tools, thereby making
reverse engineering attacks more difficult.
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CHAPTER 1
Introduction
Business organizations and companies spend an immense amount of time and
money on computer software development in order to drive a product from conception
to release. Important software development tasks include the design and integration
of complex modules into an application. In the field of software system developers,
a need to understand how existing software works is imperative. This process of
analyzing source code and technological principles such as functions, structures from
existing software binaries (exes, C/C++ object files or java class files) is called Soft-
ware Reverse Engineering (SRE) [8]. SRE involves an analysis of a software systems
components, its internal structure, or its design from software binaries. An SRE is
used for purposes listed below [6, 9]:
1. Documentation of the software or to understand how existing software works
to extend its functionality;
2. Monitoring access to resources like files, system registry [27];
3. Security audit of software applications [48];
4. Cryptanalysis of famous cryptographic systems;
5. Reverse engineering of Protocols, typically includes reversing of encryption and
hashing functions [48];
6. Software benchmarking, verification of software includes analyses and match
user expectations [48];
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7. Analysis of digital rights of a system;
8. Cheating in games;
9. and Stealing and replicating someone’s idea.
1.1 Reverse Engineering
Software reverse engineering (SRE) can be used for analysis of executable
files [17]. Examples of such analysis includes redocumenation of programs [4], code
smell detection [12], renewal of software modules [28], migration of legacy code [5],
translation of program from one language to another [25] and architecture recovery
like recovery of design patterns [2]. SRE is also used in piracy of software, and other
illegal activities.
Software Reverse Engineering (SRE) is used for the analysis of executable
files [17]. Examples of these analyses includes re-documentation of programs [4], code
smell detection [12], renewal of software modules [28], migration of legacy code [5],
translation of a program from one language to another [25] and architecture recovery
such as recovery of design patterns [2]. SRE is also used in software piracy, and other
illegal activities.
SRE of the software binaries is accomplished in three steps [6]:
1. Parsing and semantic analysis of code;
2. Extracting information from the code;
3. and Dividing the product into components.
Disassembling tools are used to parse software binaries and then a semantic
analysis is performed on each parsed code. Information gathered is stored in an
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informational base and is used to understand the softwares design and functionality.
Details obtained can be used to develop functionally superior software or similar
software with different abstractions.
Essential tools for SRE are both a disassembler and debugger [27]. Disassemblers
are used for software parsing by converting an executable (Windows exe) to the
assembly code. Issues faced in the disassembling process are separating the code
and gathering data where there is no information regarding variable names and/or
label names. Disassembling an executable file for analysis and reassembling it into
a functioning executable file is not always possible. Debuggers are used for dynamic
analysis tasks such as setting break points while the software executes and analyzes
the program flow.
Software Reverse Engineering for Java software programs is much simpler than a
native assembly code. The Java source code, when compiled, generates bytecode that
will be executed by a Java Virtual Machine (JVM). This byte code will have more
information regarding the source code than a native code will contain. This creation
of a bytecode that runs on JVM makes the Java language platform independent as
shown in Figure 1 below.
Figure 1: Platform independent Java language.
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A JVM must be installed on a computer in order to use Java language. To
execute a Java application, these intermediate symbols are read by a JVM and are
converted to machine code in order to run the process as shown in Figure 2 below.
Figure 2: Execution of Java bytecode vs Machine code.
The SRE of a Java bytecode, as explained, uses a HelloWorld example that in-
volves a mapping of the HelloWorld binary to a Java class file format; the extraction
of information occurs by opening the Java class file using a text editor. The Hel-
loWorld binary is shown in Figure 3 and the mapping of a HelloWorld binary to Java
class file format is shown in Figure 4 and Figure 5.
The Java class file format specification document [23] gives details regarding the
protocol used in forming class files by using symbols defined in the bytecode. There
are 10 basic sections to the Java class file structure [47] as demonstrated below:
1. Magic Number: 0xCAFEBABE
2. Version of Class File Format: the minor and major versions of the class file
3. Constant Pool: this pool consists of constants of the class
4. Access Flags: specified whether the class is abstract, static etc.,
5. This Class: name of the current class
4
Figure 3: Hex view of HelloWorld.class file.
6. Super Class: name of the super class
7. Interfaces: interfaces used in the class
8. Fields: fields declared in the class
9. Methods: methods declared in the class
10. Attributes: such as name of the source file, etc.,
An analysis of a HelloWorld class file [38], according to the Java class file for-
mat,gives information such as method references within the class; an example would
be System.out.println with the parameter HelloWorld! inside the main method.
A native code in assembly language will not provide this information regarding the
5
Figure 4: Class file view (HelloWorld.class).
software binary and its reverse engineering is more complex and tedious, even with
the use of SRE tools.
This SRE example of using a simple HelloWorld program demonstrates a mech-
anism for using and extracting basic information through a text editor, without the
help of an SRE tool. Extensive documentation detailing the Java bytecode and the
JVM is readily available and helpful in the development of an automated SRE tool in
order to decompile Java class files. Presently, tools, such as decompilers and pattern
detection tools are readily available to reverse engineer Java source and class files.
Decompilers are used to extract source code from Java binaries, and pattern detection
tools are used where analyzing design patterns from an extracted Java source or its
binaries is needed.
6
Figure 5: Constant Pool table.
1.2 Anti-reverse Engineering
Anti-reverse engineering is the process to protect software from reverse engineer-
ing. The software community is facing a tough challenge in order to protect software
from attackers and to prevent its misuse. According to [9], The patent system is
not quite as effective with software as it is with traditionally engineered tangible ar-
tifacts. While a patent mandates IP protection it is next to impossible to prove
or even suspect any IP theft in a software product that might have been the result
of a malicious reverse engineering attack on a patented competitor. The goal of any
anti-reverse engineering technique is to increase the amount of work needed to reverse
engineer software and increase the reversing time beyond the life-time of a software
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application.
1.3 Reversing and Anti-reversing Tools
There are many tools available in order to reverse engineer software applications:
reverse engineering tools such as disassemblers that extract system blocks information
using an assembly code from an executable file; debuggers used for dynamic analysis;
and decompilers to gain the source code from software binaries. Tools can be open
source and/or commercial software [37]. Most use disassembling and debugging tools
available include OllyDbg, IDA Pro, and WinDbg. Apart from disassembling and
debugging, these tools can also produce additional information [9].
A Java byte code is not created in a human readable format; in fact, it has a
close resemblance to the source code and will help in understanding basic details of
a program. The tools available for reverse engineering Java are JaD [36], JODE [22],
MOCHA [18], DJ Java decompiler [3], and PINOT [34].
In order to defend the need for reversing software binaries, necessary research is
being conducted within the software community. Suggested mechanisms for making
it more difficult to reverse engineer software include: software obfuscation; physically
protecting a software application platform; encrypting an executable; and watermark-
ing the software [9]. The main idea of our project is to use code obfuscation; we start
with an analysis of the design pattern detection tools and implement our obfuscation
tool by following the techniques described in [29].
1.4 Related Work and Project Goal
Software obfuscation is an anti-reverse engineering mechanism that changes the
structure of a given code with no change to its functionality. There are three types
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of obfuscation used: control-flow obfuscation in order to obscure the flow of control;
dataobfuscation that makes understanding data fields difficult; and layout-obfuscation
where we split logic into separate procedures. Many obfuscation tools are available; a
list of open source obfuscation tools is given in [35, 14] and these are ProGuard [13],
yGuard [49], SandMark [7], jarg [19], bb mug (BebboSoft) [41], JavaGuard [43], as
well as commercial tools such as Allatori [40], Zelix KlassMaster [50], and JShrink [11].
These obfuscation tools support functions such as:
1. Rename class, method, field and local names to some random meaningless
strings;
2. Removing debugging information;
3. Removing dead code and constant fields (Shrinking the code);
4. Optimizing local variable allocation;
5. and Exception Obfuscation.
The tools listed above implement a control-flow obfuscation, data-obfuscation
and layoutobfuscation; however, these tools do not perform a design level obfuscation.
Functions supported by these tools do not bring a structural change in the class level
(i.e., removing interfaces, adding abstractions) and will not bring a major change in
class level interactions. Obscuring a design requires change in the relationship between
software system class components. Design patterns mainly use an inheritance feature
of an object oriented program; we need to obscure this inheritance level relationship
between classes in order to hide and shield architecture from a pattern detection tool.
Present obfuscation tools do protect programs and make it difficult to reverse
engineer. However, these obfuscation tools cannot hide the software system design
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level mechanism. In Chapter 3, we describe obfuscation using current available tools
that do not show hiding patterns from detection tools. These experiments clearly
demonstrate that three obfuscations, control-flow; dataflow; and layout obfuscations,
do not completely obfuscate the design level architecture.
Design obfuscation is necessary in order to obfuscate object oriented programs
that protect applications from reverse engineering. Software obfuscation techniques
described in [29], class-coalescing, class-splitting, and type-hiding, can be used for
design obfuscation. In a class-coalescing technique two or more classes are combined
into a single class; for class-splitting a single class is split into a number of classes with
the functionality divided between them. Type-hiding is used to increase the number
of interfaces that are implemented by classes.
These techniques are implemented into Design Obfuscator Java (DOJ) applica-
tion [29] that uses Soot optimization framework to analyze the bytecodes within an
application. A DOJ tool design obfuscation was tested on medium and large sized
programs. Results demonstrate that class-splitting resulted in an overhead of 10
Tasks completed in this project were to implement a design obfuscation tool that
will obfuscate 23 Gang of Four (GoF) design patterns that hide an internal architec-
ture from reverse engineering. Design obfuscation techniques, described in [29], such
as class-coalescing and class-splitting are applied to binaries. This obfuscated source
is tested for design pattern detection by running pattern detection tools. Before and
after obfuscation results are compared and analyzed in Chapter 5.
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1.5 Organization of the Report
This project report is organized as follows:
• Chapter 2 will describe the decompilers used in Java reverse engineering, intro-
duction to design patterns, and pattern detection tools.
• Chapter 3 explains an obfuscation approach used for important design patterns.
• Chapter 4 presents the implementation details used by the developed software
tool.
• Chapter 5 shows results from two pattern detection tools, and comparing pro-
posed obfuscator to present obfuscators.
• Chapter 6 concludes our report and provides future work.
11
CHAPTER 2
Reverse Engineering Java
The reverse engineering of a Java class file is simple, as class files contain most
of the information about the original source code. Many decompilers, and design
extraction tools for source and class files are available.
2.1 Java Decompilers
A Java decompiler is used to covert our java class files (*.class) into source code
files (*.java). Many software applications do not provide their source code; however
these applications can be reverse engineered by using decompilers in order to obtain
source Java files for analysis. Many Java decompilers are available [37], and a few
effective tools are as follows:
1. Jad Java decompiler [36]
2. DJ Java decompiler [3]
3. JODE decompiler and optimizer [22]
4. Mocha java decompiler [18]
5. JD (Java Decompiler) [21]
Our list includes a decompiler that can be run through either a command line
or GUI. The inner working of these decompilers by decompiling HelloWorld class file
and evaluation of various decompilers [20], will be explained in the next subsections.
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2.1.1 Reverse Engineering HelloWorld Java program
By decompiling a simple HelloWorld class file we can demonstrate the working
of all these decompilers. The following below in Figure 6 is the code for the Hel-
loWorld.java program. We compiled this program using a Java compiler in order to
create a HelloWorld.class file.
Figure 6: HelloWorld Source
2.1.1.1 JAD
The Java Decompiler (JAD) is an old decompiler and currently not under main-
tenance [36]. JAD provides a command line interface that decompiles class files to
Java files. Decompiled program of HelloWorld.class file is as shown in Figure 7.
13
Figure 7: JAD decompiled HelloWorld
2.1.1.2 DJ Java Decompiler
A DJ Java decompiler is the GUI version of JAD and one of the most widely
used decompilers. A full version of DJ Java decompiler is available for $19.99 [3], and
a decompiled HelloWorld program, using a Trial version, is shown in the Figure 8.
14
Figure 8: DJ Java decompiled HelloWorld.java
2.1.1.3 JODE
After installing the JODE decompiler, we start decompiling the process of our
HelloWorld.class file using the following command as shown in Figure 9 below:
Figure 9: JODE decompiled HelloWorld.java
JODE can decompile all class files that do not contain any dependencies; it
displays an error trying to decompile class files with dependencies and also it cannot
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understand complex expressions or statements within the program.
2.1.1.4 Mocha
This decompiler is also not under maintenance and it reportedly has problems
decompiling class files created by recent a Java compiler version [18]. The decompiled
HelloWorld.java program is shown in Figure 10 below:
Figure 10: Mocha decompiled HelloWorld.java
2.1.1.5 JD - Java Decompiler
A Java decompiler (JD) is available as a library JD-Core, in GUI JD-GUI and
a plugin for eclipse JD-Eclipse [21] is also available. A decompiled HelloWorld class
file, on JD-GUI, is shown in Figure 11:
2.1.2 Evaluation of Decompilers
Evaluating decompilers requires tests that contain different types of source code;
an example would be a code with exceptions, try-catch blocks, and interface abstrac-
tions. In [20] the authors used a set of classes to evaluate commonly used and available
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Figure 11: JD decompiled HelloWorld.java
decompilers. The decompilers that were evaluated are shown in Figure 12, below.
Figure 12: Java Bytecode Decompilers [20]
The decompilers are scored according to output results shown in Figure 13, and
decompiler test results are shown in Figure 14.
Decompiler results conclude that ClassCracker3, jdec, jReversePro, Mocha,
SourceTec (Jasmine) decompilers preform poorly and are not able to decompile a
single program from the given set. Dava, Jad, and JODE decompilers performed
similarly when decompiling five programs from the set; but for the most part, JODE
17
Figure 13: Decompilation Correctness Classification [20]
correctly decompiled the programs. The JD decompiler out-performed Dava, and
Jad in recovering most of the source programs within the given set. SourceAgain is
the only commercial decompiler that performed well, however it is no longer sold or
supported.
2.2 Design patterns and Pattern detection tools
Pattern detection tools were implemented in order to detect design patterns.
Software systems are built using design patterns in order to solve design specific
problems. There are at least 250 existing patterns that are used in an object oriented
world. The 23 GoF patterns are well known and widely used patterns. In this
section, we will discuss, in brief, the 12 GoF patterns using examples, followed by
18
Figure 14: Decompiler Test Results [20]
pattern detection tools and their efficiency.
2.2.1 Design Patterns
Computer science software design problems are solved using design patterns.
These design patterns are reusable and use object oriented techniques that provide a
design for software development in various fields. In our project we will address the
23 GoF design patterns [15]. Design patterns are grouped into three categories [15]
creational patterns, structural patterns, and behavioral patterns. In this subsection
we will discuss 12 design patterns, problems each pattern resolves, and when a given
pattern must be applied using an example. These 12 design patterns will also be
used to explain obfuscation techniques in Chapter 3. The 23 GoF design patterns are
divided into categories are listed below.
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Creational Patterns: These are design patterns that deal with the creation of
an object according to a given situation. Creational patterns are formed by encapsu-
lating the knowledge of given object in order to create and hide the instances of how
these objects are created. There are five creational patterns listed below.
1. AbstractFactory
2. Builder
3. FactoryMethod
4. Prototype
5. Singleton
Structural Patterns: In software engineering, structural patterns solve prob-
lems of realizing relationships between different entities. A software system consists
of a number of classes interacting with each other in order to complete an applica-
tion. The type of structural pattern is often selected according to a given situation
examples include: adapting an object, and creating complex type from simpler types.
Below is the list of structural patterns:
1. Adapter
2. Bridge
3. Composite
4. Decorator
5. Facade
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6. Flyweight
7. Proxy
Behavioral Patterns: These patterns solve design problems by implementing
a common communication and implementation between entities. Communicating
between entities involves mediating between classes, notifying the state of an object,
and selecting different algorithms at run time. The list of behavioral patterns is given
below:
1. Chain of Responsibility
2. Command
3. Interpreter
4. Iterator
5. Mediator
6. Memento
7. Observer
8. State
9. Strategy
10. TemplateMethod
11. Visitor
21
A description of commonly used and important design patterns is explained
below along with examples. Obfuscation of these examples, types of obfuscation, and
obfuscation testing will be explained further in Chapter 3.
2.2.1.1 FactoryMethod Pattern
This pattern solves the problem of creating objects without specifying an ex-
act class initialization of an object. Initiating different objects in the application
could duplicate the use of code and might increase memory requirements. The Fac-
toryMethod pattern defines a separate abstract method that can be overridden by all
subclasses and the derived type object is used further within the application [10].
Example:
Below we see a Factory Product example; it has a Factory Interface that specifies
generic behavior for the products. The Client, when using identification details,
requests a product from the ConcreteFactory in order to initialize the Product
variable which uses concrete products. The ConcreteProduct is an implementation
of the Product interface; there can be different implementations depending on the
type of product. The UML diagram of a Factory Product example is shown in
Figure 15.
22
Figure 15: UML diagram of FactoryMethod Pattern [10]
2.2.1.2 AbstractFactory Pattern
The AbstractFactory is also a creational pattern used to create a family of re-
lated products without explicitly specifying their classes. Consider the example of an
AbstractFactory class that can create products from two product families: Abstract-
ProductA and AbstractProductB. The UML diagram for this program is shown in
Figure 16.
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Figure 16: UML diagram of AbstractFactory Pattern [10]
Example:
An AbstractFactory is the abstract class that creates concrete classes where spe-
cific products are created. Product creation is accomplished through different abstrac-
tion implementations, namely AbstractProductA and AbstractProductB. When a
client wants to change a product type a new concrete factory can be easily assigned
to the AbstractFactory class and then new set of concrete products can be created.
2.2.1.3 Builder Pattern
This pattern is used to build complex products using several small objects within
the application. Developing a complex application requires complex classes and ob-
jects; these complex objects can be developed using some smaller objects that follow
a defined algorithm. A Builder pattern can be used to create complex objects using
smaller objects according to an algorithm or procedure. Figure 17 shows the UML
diagram for the Builder pattern.
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Figure 17: UML diagram of Builder Pattern [10]
Example:
The Client class calls the main() method that will initiate a Builder and
Director class. A Builder class represents a complex object that needs to be
built using other small objects and types. The Director receives this Builder
class and is responsible for calling appropriate methods that create a complex ob-
ject. A Client can call a respective ConcreteBuilder depending on the parameters
defined to create different complex objects. An example would be, a TextConverter
that converts an RTF document to an ASCII document. An RTFReader class will
be acting as a Director, where a TextConverter interface is a Builder interface
and an ASCIIConverter is an implementation of Builder, i.e., TextConverter. An
ASCIIConverter reads each character or string from an RTFReader, then converts
and writes to an ASCII document by following the Builder pattern.
25
2.2.1.4 Adapter Pattern
This pattern is used to solve the problem of adapting an object to a particular
operation. During software development, it is expected that the need for an object
and another class that offers the same features and implements another interface will
be required. Using both will diminish the need for re-implementing one of them. An
Adapter pattern is used for this purpose and is used to implement required features.
Figure 18, below, shows the UML diagram for this Adapter pattern.
Figure 18: UML diagram of Adapter Pattern [10]
Example:
An Adapter class uses an Adaptee delegation in order to adapt to the request
function overridden from the Target interface. A Client uses this Target interface
to initiate different adapters and then uses them according to a given situation.
26
2.2.1.5 Bridge Pattern
A Bridge pattern is a structural pattern used for designing different abstraction
implementations defined within the application. Often a single abstraction could
contain different implementations. Consider the persistence of a data object over a
different platform using either relational databases or file system structures (files or
folders). A Bridge pattern can be used to decouple an abstraction from the imple-
mentation so that the two can vary independently. Figure 19, below, shows the UML
diagram for the Persistence example using a Bridge pattern:
Figure 19: UML diagram of Bridge Pattern [10]
Example:
An example of a persistence API that can have many implementations for the
presence of file system or relational database, is described below.
A Persistence Interface illustrates an Abstraction interface that can have
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different implementations. A PersistenceImplementor is the Implementor inter-
face can be implemented for a file system as a FileSystemPersistenceImplementor
and for relational data base called a DatabasePersistenceImplementor. These
Implementor implementations can be used as delegations to perform various functions
within concrete Persistence implementations.
2.2.1.6 Flyweight Pattern
This design pattern is used to create a large number of objects with shared states.
Some applications required a large number of objects with sharing states among them.
Example:
An example of a Wargame that needs to instantiate a large number of soldier
objects is described. A soldier object has the graphical representation of a soldier,
firing a weapon, and additional characteristics. Initiating a large number of soldier
objects is necessary; however, this task will require a considerable amount of system
memory. A Flyweight pattern can be used to create various soldier objects, by sharing
states through a common function (in the present example moveSoldier function).
The UML diagram for the Wargame application is shown in Figure 20.
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Figure 20: UML diagram of Flyweight Pattern [10]
2.2.1.7 Decorator Pattern
A Decorator pattern is used to demonstrate the relationship, during runtime,
between entities. In software development we can extend an objects functionality
statically, at compile time by using inheritance. However, in some situations we need
to extend functionality dynamically during runtime.
Example:
An example of a graphical window, used to create a FrameWindow class would
decorate a Window class and a FrameWindow object created statically by the client
program. This use of a FrameWindow needs to initiate different objects within the
clients program. Decorator pattern can be used to create a FrameWindow dynamically,
without creating objects in the clients program. The UML diagram demonstrating a
Graphical Window application, using a Decorator Pattern, is shown in Figure 21.
The Window interface represents a component interface, and a SimpleWindow
implements the Window interface in order to create a general window. A
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DecoratorWindow is the implementation containing special and extra decorative
added features. This DecoratorWindow can be extended by using various classes
such as a ScrollableWindow class, that add special features to decorate a window as
shown in Figure 21.
Figure 21: UML diagram of Decorator Pattern [10]
2.2.1.8 Mediator Pattern
A Mediator pattern is a behavioral pattern that aids in the interaction of large
number of classes. A software project using object oriented design, will have classes
that interact with each other in order to implement a particular application. If an
algorithm or principle is not followed it is very difficult to understand and run the
application. A Mediator pattern can be used to remove the tight coupling behavior
of the above design. Figure 22, shows the UML diagram of a Mediator pattern.
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Figure 22: UML diagram of Mediator Pattern [10]
Example:
Consider an example of developing a screen that contains different controls. Var-
ious controls need to interact with other controls. For example, if a button is pressed
it must determine if the data is valid in other controls. Therefore in different ap-
plications these controls need to interact differently. To solve this problem we use
a Mediator pattern that can be extended with different implementations in order to
serve our purpose.
A Colleague is the abstraction interface that will be implemented by the con-
crete colleagues i.e., screens. All screens must determine the change on one screen
and this information must be shared with other screens using the concrete mediator
implementation from the Mediator abstraction.
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2.2.1.9 Observer Pattern
An Observer pattern solves the problem of updating the state to certain other
objects. In object oriented programming, objects have states and it is within these
states changes are made within objects. In some cases, it is necessary to be informed
about the changes occuring in within other objects. An Observer pattern can be used
when a subject has to be observed by one or more observers.
Example:
Lets consider an example of news agency that publishes news to different sub-
scribers, where subscribers can receive their news in different forms: Emails, and/or
SMS.
A NewsPublisher class will act as an Observable interface and will be extended
by the type of news it distributes such as business, sports, entertainment and so on.
Subscribers (Email and SMS) will then act as Observers
A NewsPublisher keeps a list of all current Subscribers and informs them of the
latest news. NewsPublisher, if there is change in the state of latest news, will notify
all subscribers. Figure 23 shows the UML diagram of a NewsPublisher application.
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Figure 23: UML diagram of Observer Pattern [10]
2.2.1.10 Strategy Pattern
This pattern enables the user to select an appropriate class with a selected be-
havior at runtime. Some classes during software development differ only in their
behavior. In this case, it is better to use a Strategy pattern where separate behaviors
are developed into different classes, aloong with isolating algorithms enabling them
to select an appropriate class at runtime.
Example:
Consider an example of the Robot simulation, this will have an IBehavior inter-
face as its Strategy abstraction. This abstraction is implemented by behaviors such
as the attack strategies of a robot. The UML diagram for the Robot application
is shown in Figure 24. In the present example, aggressive, defensive, and normal
strategies are implemented for the IBehavior interface.
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Figure 24: UML diagram of Strategy Pattern [10]
2.2.1.11 TemplateMethod Pattern
This pattern solves design problems through an abstract method that is im-
plemented by the subclasses. In some applications it is necessary that a subclass
implement all the necessary methods; these methods will be used to gain the final
results. A Template method design pattern can be used for this purpose. In practice,
the template method allows subclasses to override a few steps of the algorithm and
the final step is performed by a Super class using implemented steps.
Example:
For example, a Travel agency has several trips to select from and to create a new
class for each trip will require more memory. In this case a Template method pattern
can be used, where a Trip abstract class has methods for an overall trip. Different trip
packages must implement this Trip abstract class and the Client can call necessary
functions to perform the total trip. The UML diagram for this process is shown in
Figure 25. In this example the performTrip function will act as template method that
has a total or a partial implementation of the entire trip. Once the abstract methods
for each day are overridden by each Package, invoking a performTrip function will
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complete the desired trip.
Figure 25: UML diagram of TemplateMethod Pattern [10]
2.2.1.12 Visitor Pattern
This pattern completes an operation on each element of the collection with dif-
ferent data types. Collections are data types widely used in all Object oriented
programming languages. They often contain objects of different types. To perform
a command operation on these collections we need to know the type of instances
that are stored within the collection. After determining the instance types, we use
instanceof function for each object to check and perform particular operations. This
kind of checking is not object oriented and uses numerous if-else conditions. A Visi-
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tor pattern can be used for this situation, where each object is visited and an object
related operation is performed [10].
Example:
A Customers application can be considered an example of a Visitor pattern.
In this application, a reporting module is created for a customer group. To gather
statistics you need specific details for all the customers within a particular group. An
IVisitor is the interface that has abstractions for all the visit methods within all the
visitable objects. An Interface IVisitable should be implemented by all visitable
objects and should override the accept() method. A CustomerGroup, Customer,
Order and Item classes are considered visitable classes. The GeneralReport is the
IVisitor implementation and output the customer statistics. The UML diagram of
the Customers application is shown in Figure 26.
A GeneralReport will call visit methods for each customer present in
CustomerGroup and obtain the number of orders for each customer and retrieve the
number of items purchased for each order. Finally, a report is displayed demonstrat-
ing the Customer buying behavior.
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Figure 26: UML diagram of Visitor Pattern [10]
2.2.2 Pattern detection tools
A Design pattern detection is another reverse engineering technique that aids
in analyzing a majority of the design patterns used within the Java source code
or binaries. There are several pattern detection tools available that use different
algorithms for detecting design patterns from software binaries or source. A few of
the pattern detection tools are:
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1. SPOOL [39]
2. Hedgehog [1]
3. Reclipse [24]
4. PINOT (Pattern INference and recOvery Tool) [33, 34]
5. Similarity Scoring [31, 32]
2.2.2.1 SPOOL and Hedgehog
A SPOOL was developed in order to reverse engineer design patterns from C++
software binaries [39]. A HEDGEHOG system was developed using pattern descrip-
tion language called SPINE [1]. SPINE is a language similar to Prolog and contains
typed first order logic for describing patterns; it is not currently available for down-
load. Patterns detected can be verified using a HEDGEHOG system to distinguish
between patterns.
2.2.2.2 Reclipse
A Reclipse is a reverse engineering tool for automatic pattern detection from a
Java source code. It uses UML2.0 diagrams from the source code in order to un-
derstand the design (i.e., object diagrams for structure based and UML sequence
diagrams for behavioral based designs). Reclipse provides two graphical editors for
structural and behavioral patterns. Detection of a specified pattern starts from de-
tecting possible design pattern occurrences (candidates); once detected, they are given
a percentage rating. A dynamic analysis is used to confirm or reject this percentage
rating. Installation of this tool requires Eclipse IDE v3.6.1, and Eclipse Modeling
Tools, version 3.6.1 [24], however, these exact versions of the software are not avail-
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able for download.
2.2.2.3 PINOT
A Pattern INterference and recOvery Tool (PINOT) [34] takes a creative ap-
proach in detecting design patterns. According to [33], the authors of PINOT used
their own reverse engineering techniques and characteristics that classify GoF de-
sign patterns in an attempt to detect design patterns from a Java source code. The
authors discuss four reverse engineering techniques:
1. language-provided,
2. structure-driven,
3. behavior-driven,
4. and domain-specific patterns.
Prototype and Iterator patterns are classified as language-provided patterns, as
they are widely used and implemented in many languages. Classes that have inter-
class relationships, such as Adapter and Facade patterns, are identified as structure-
driven patterns; and the classes that differ in certain behavioral requirements, such as
Singleton and Flyweight, are deemed as behavior-driven patterns. Finally, GoF pat-
terns used in certain domains such as Interpreter and Command patterns are known
as domain-specific patterns. PINOT focuses on detecting structure and behavior
driven patterns as given in [33].
In order to detect structure-driven patterns that has interclass relationships for
Adapter (adapter vs adaptee), Facade (Facade vs subparts) and Proxy (proxy vs real),
we identify patterns that share a common goal of defining a new class which hide other
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classes from system integration or simplification. For detection of behavioral-driven
patterns, a different approach is used; their pattern detection technique is trained
on GoF behavioral patterns then the given model is subjected to various inputs and
the output is examined according the known behavior. For example, once a singleton
pattern instantiates its data object, the same one should always be returned under
multiple subsequent requests.
The PINOT pattern detection tool occasionally detects false positives [33, 16];
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The PINOT tool is developed using an IBM Jikes Java Compiler; using a Java
compiler allows this tool the ability to compare the design pattern data using Ab-
stract Syntax Graphs, created by Jikes. The input source files are parsed using a
Jikes compiler with a PINOT back-end, then the detected patterns are output to the
command-line interface. A PINOT command-line interface for testing the 23 GoF
design patterns is shown in Figure 27, and Figure 30 which shows detected patterns
for this test.
2.2.2.4 Similarity Scoring
Similarity scoring is a design pattern extraction tool that can be downloaded
at [32]. This pattern detection tool has a unique way of building matrices for pat-
tern detection and does not depend on behavioral characteristics. Their principle of
considering only structural characteristics makes it difficult to detect patterns, such
as State and Strategy which only differ in behavior.
The similarity detection of large software systems, with an increased presence
of the great number of system classes and multiple roles and classes would lead to
efficiency problems due to slow convergence of the algorithm [31]. An advantage to
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Figure 27: PINOT Command-line Interface
using this tool is that it does not follow any heuristics in detecting patterns and can
be applied to any pattern once trained on that patterns input. This tool has been
tested on three types of open source software: JHotDraw, JRefactory, and JUnit,
each demonstrate limited false negatives and no false positives.
The process of detection follows the building of matrices from Java class files
and comparing them to known matrices [31]. The rationale of a similarity scoring
algorithm is from the proposed iterative algorithm in order to calculate the similarity
between the vertices of two directed graphs. In the similarity matrix, each entry
expressed a similarity vertex i of one matrix is to vertex j from another matrix.
Two graph matching algorithms are applied to form pattern graphs: an Exact graph
matching and an Inexact graph matching algorithm.
An Exact graph matching algorithm finds one-to-one mapping between the ver-
tices of two graphs and also has the same number of nodes. Inexact graph matching
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is applied when we cannot find isomorphism between two graphs and aim at find-
ing the best possible match between two graphs. Association and Generalization
matrices were created using edges from generalization and association graphs; each
were formed using graph matching algorithms with connected edges such as 1 and 0,
otherwise.
Methodology of detecting design patterns is accomplished in five steps as [31]:
1. Reverse engineering of the system under study;
2. Detection of inheritance hierarchies;
3. Construction of subsystem matrices;
4. Application of similarity algorithm between the subsystem matrices and the
pattern matrices;
5. and Extraction of patterns in each subsystem.
The input class files are reverse engineered to obtain component information that
can be used to detect the inheritance relationships. This class information is used
in building two graphs Association and Generalization graphs. Matching is followed
by matching two graphs using matching algorithms and creating subsystem matrices.
Generalization and Association matrices are Similarity scored using a specific algo-
rithm. The extractions of pattern instances is performed as a similarity algorithm
resulting in score of 1 for subsystems and are considered to be exact matching to
the patterns; for subsystems with a score of less than 1, a characteristic study and
specific pattern detection process is followed to find a pattern match.
This similarity scoring is developed using Java and has a graphical user inter-
face that shows results and we can output the results to an XML file. Usage of a
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Java bytecode manipulation framework helps in static analysis of a systems struc-
ture that will help in retrieving abstraction, inheritance, class attributes, constructor
signatures, method signatures, and other more advanced properties such as similar
abstract method invocation, and a template method. The Adapter/Command and
State/Strategy patterns are grouped for detection results; this might be because they
do not check behavioral characteristics.
Figure 28: Similairty Scoring Command-line Interface
A Similarity scoring GUI is started through a command line as shown in Fig-
ure 28 results from a tool using a GUI are shown in Figure 29. The results window
demonstrates that it cannot detect all 23 GoF patterns out of the detected patterns
as Prototype and Proxy patterns are not detected. Figure 30 shows patterns detected
for this test.
Using these tools, PINOT and Similarity scoring are available and can be used
for testing. Therefore, for this project PINOT and Similarity Scoring were used to
test an obfuscated code. The created obfuscated source is compiled in order to form
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Figure 29: Similairty Scoring User Interface
class files; both source and class files are used as inputs to PINOT and Similarity
Scoring respectively in an attempt to analyze patterns detected.
2.2.2.5 Pattern detection results for PINOT and Similarity Scoring
The package given as input for these tools contains all 23 GoF patterns and some
patterns appear more than once. The number of patterns detected from both tools is
shown in Figure 30 and Figure 31. From Figure 30 ”*” represents Adapter/Command
patterns detected under single pattern, and ””˜ represents State/Strategy patterns are
also detected under single pattern.
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Figure 30: Patterns detected from 23 GoF patterns
The results from a PINOT tool shows less detection for creational patterns (from
AbstractFactory Singleton in table) as we can see from Figure 30, only one Singleton
pattern is detected out of four Singletons present in the original source. For the
structural patterns (from Adapter - Proxy) tool we detected at least one instance for
all patterns except Adapter and Decorator, and there are two false positives out of
four detected Facade patterns, and one false positive for Flyweight and one for Bridge.
The Behavioral patterns from CoR (Chain of Responsibility) to Visitor, were not able
to detect Command, Interpreter, Iterator, and Memento. One false positive in the
Strategy patterns were detected and two Observer patterns detected were Visitor
patterns; from 10 Mediator patterns we detected two false positives and one Facade
pattern detected was a Mediator pattern. Figure 32 below shows all false positives
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Figure 31: Graph for Patterns detected
for the PINOT tool.
Figure 32: PINOT false positives
There are no false positives detected from the Similarity scoring detection tool,
but it cannot detect all the pattern instances present within the input source; therefore
only four patterns Factory patterns were detected out of six instances, out of 7 ( 4
Adapter and 3 Command) instances it can only detect six instances as shown in
Figure 30. We ran one more comparison analysis using PINOT and the Similarity
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Scoring technique is explained in [16] using JEdit and JHotDraw packages; they
discuss algorithms used and do not address how exact patterns were detected.
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CHAPTER 3
Obfuscation of Design Patterns
This section describes obfuscation techniques applied to the 23 GoF design pat-
terns. Firstly, we will obfuscate a source using available obfuscation tools such as
Proguard [13], SandMark [7], jarg [19], BebboSoft (bb mug) [41], and JavaGuard [43]
followed by testing detected and compared patterns before and after obfuscation. We
then obfuscate design patterns using our proposed tool and detected patterns will
be compared to patterns used in an actual source. These results are analyzed and
discussed in Chapter 5.
3.1 Obfuscation using available tools
This section shows obfuscation of GoF patterns using jarg, JavaGuard, BeeboSoft
(bb mug), Proguard, and Sandmark. Sandmark obfuscated class files are tested using
Similarity scoring as we cannot decompile class files. Class files obfuscated from other
obfuscators are decompiled to source files and tested using PINOT. Then results are
compared to patterns detected on an original source from Section 2.2.5.
3.1.1 jarg - Java Archive Grinder tool
The obfuscation tool jarg is used to obfuscate a Java bytecode; this tool contains
features such as an optimizer, an obfuscator, a shrinker and a reducer [19]. Obfusca-
tion starts by analyzing the Java class files, performing removal of unnecessary code
such as unused functions, and debugging information; after classes, fields, methods
and interfaces are renamed and optimized. This obfuscation tool can quickly obfus-
cate, optimize, or shrink a Java package, or jar file. We then obfuscated the original
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design pattern source using jarg and then ran pattern detection tools to examine
results and compare them to results before obfuscation.
3.1.1.1 Design pattern obfuscation
jarg is a command line tool that can be easily accessed using command [19]:
java -jar jarg.jar -nocomp abc.jar
nocomp : no compressed output jar
This command will obfuscate the source abc.jar and creates new jar file abc s.jar
in the same location. An abc s.jar file is extracted in order to obtain obfuscated
class files that are used for testing a Similarity scoring algorithm. The decompiling
of obfuscated source was unsuccessful so PINOT cannot be used.
3.1.1.2 Analysis of results
Obfuscation using jarg does not show changes in patterns detected; the same
number of patterns are detected from the original source as shown in Figure 30 and
Figure 31.
3.1.2 JavaGuard
JavaGuard is one more Java bytecode obfuscator; this tool can be included as
a package within regular software development and testing processes [43]. Obfusca-
tion of this tool follows three obfuscation techniques: class-flow, data, and layout
obfuscations. We then obfuscated design patterns using JavaGuard then ran pattern
detection tools in order to compare results with the normal design patterns source.
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3.1.2.1 Design patterns obfuscation
JavaGuard is also a command line tool without much documentation. This
tool uses a Jakarta-ORO for regular expression matching, and achieves an input
parameter as a jar file that will generate an output jar as specified through the
command line. A script file can also be used to configure an obfuscator in an attempt
to prevent certain classes, fields, and methods from being renamed. The Command
to run JavaGuard on a normal source is as shown below:
java -cp javaguard.jar;jakarta-oro-2.0.6.jar JavaGuard
i normalSource.jar o obfusSource.jar
-cp : classpath
-i : input
-o : output
This command will obfuscate class files present in the normalSource.jar and store
them in an output obfusSource.jar within a specified location (using this command
it will be stored in the same location)
3.1.2.2 Analysis of results
Obfuscation using JavaGuard cannot hide patterns from the detection tools; the
same number of patterns were detected as shwon in Figure 30. Therefore, obfuscating
using JavaGuard does not help hide the design from pattern detection tools.
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3.1.3 BebboSoft (bb mug) obfuscation tool
The bb mug is a tiny and fast Java bytecode obfuscator [41]; this tool replaces
class, method and field names with shorter names, then it removes all information
that is not required for execution, and specified packages are renamed.
3.1.3.1 Design patterns obfuscation
bb mug is also a command line tool that is executed using the following
command
USAGE: java -jar bb mug.jar [-?] [-l <logfile>]
[-p <package>=<newpackage>] <inpath> <outpath>
-? display this message
-l <logfile> write mapping info into file
-p <package>=<newpackage> rename <package> to <newpackage>
Add bb mug.jar to CLASSPATH, enter the folder with a normalSource.jar file
and run the command:
java jar bb mug.jar normalSource.jar obfusSource.jar
This will create obfuscated design pattern class files in jar file format, extract
jar file, and run a Similarity detection tool. A decompiler is not available that can
extract source from obfuscated class files so it cannot run a PINOT pattern detection
tool.
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3.1.3.2 Analysis of results
Obfuscating using bb mug also did not help in hiding design patterns from Simi-
larity detection; there was no change in patterns detected when compared to patterns
detected as seen in Figure 30 and Figure 31.
3.1.4 Proguard Obfuscation tool
Proguard is an opensource Java class file shrinker, optimizer, obfuscator, and pre-
verifier [13]. The Java file shrinker removes unused classes, fields, methods and then
attributes and optimizes the bytecode removing unused instructions. This obfusca-
tion step involves the renaming of classes, fields, and methods using short meaningless
names. Proguard typically reads the input as jar, war, zip, or directories and outputs
are suggested as jar, war, and zip files. For the present obfuscation we are not using
shrinker and optimizer as it effects the operation of our design patterns. The Pro-
guard tool is available in command line and GUI; we used a GUI to obfuscate class
files from the 23 GoF patterns.
3.1.4.1 Design pattern obfuscation
The zip file for design pattern class files is displayed as an input to the Proguard
GUI as shown in Figure 33, and obfuscation options are selected using a configura-
tion pro file. The obfuscated class files are given as input to the JODE decompiler;
decompiled source files are used to test for pattern detection for PINOT, and the
obfuscated class files are used for Similarity scoring.
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Figure 33: Proguard GUI In/Out options
3.1.4.2 Analysis of results
The obfuscated source and class files are tested using pattern detection tools. The
results from PINOT and Similarity scoring are shown in Figure 34 and Figure 35.
The results show that the PINOT tool cannot detect both the CoR (Chain
of Responsibility) and Facade patterns. The Factory pattern was detected in four
instances along with one false positive compared to zero detected in the original
source. Composite patterns also show four instances with two false positives and
a false positive for Bridge, and Flyweight patterns, as shown in Figure 36. Seven
instances of the Mediator pattern compared to 10 patterns detected from normal
source.
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Figure 34: Patterns detected using Proguard
Similarity scoring cannot detect Visitor pattern except that there is no change
with the patterns detected from the original source. igure 36 represents a bar graph
represents comparing PINOT and Similarity scoring demonstrating actual patterns
present.
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Figure 35: Detected patterns graph using Proguard
Figure 36: PINOT false positives
3.1.5 Sandmark Obfuscation tool
Sandmark is the tool developed for software watermarking, tamper proofing, and
code obfuscation of Java bytecode [7]. This tool was developed at the University of
Arizona in an attempt to study the effectiveness of software protection algorithms.
The tool integrates the number of static and dynamic watermarking algorithms,a
large collection of obfuscation algorithms, various code optimizers, and a tool to
view and analyze the Java bytecode. The Sandmark obfuscation feature is used for
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the present testing. There are 39 different algorithms available to obfuscate a Java
bytecode. These algorithms are used to obfuscate the design patterns source; the
obfuscated class files cannot be decompiled to source code to test using PINOT.
Three algorithms: SplitClasses, Objectify and OverloadName are able to hide a few
design patterns; all other algorithms show the same number of patterns as an original
source. Results from these three obfuscation techniques are explained as follows.
3.1.5.1 Design pattern obfuscation
The jar file of design pattern class files is given as an input to the Sandmark GUI
as shown in Figure 37 and an obfuscation algorithm is selected through the drop down
present in the right side of input and output fields. The obfuscated jar file is saved
at the location mentioned in output filed. This obfuscated source jar is extracted to
generate class files, but cannot be decompiled using the decompiler. These extracted
class files are used to test for pattern detection using a Similarity scoring tool, as
there is no source available for testing using PINOT.
Three obfuscation techniques are used: Split classes, Objectify and Overload-
Names. Split classes obfuscation is the obfuscation technique that splits a single class
into a number of classes. Objectify is a type of obfuscation technique that creates
a large number of objects of the same instance to confuse detection tools and Over-
loadNames will rename all classes, methods, and fields names by changing targeted
access specifiers.
3.1.5.2 Analysis of results
The results of pattern detection tools using a obfuscation source from three
obfuscation algorithms is shown in Figure 38. A decompiler tool is not available that
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Figure 37: Sandmark GUI
can extract the source code from these obfuscated source files; therefore we cannot
run a PINOT detection tool. Similarity scoring detection is used, and the patterns
detected are shown in Figure 38. The graph showing the difference between actual
patterns present and number of patterns detected using three obfuscation techniques
using Similarity scoring is shown in Figure 39.
Results from these three obfuscation algorithms, Split class, Objectify and Over-
loadName demonstrate that, OverloadNames obfuscation can only hide a Visitor
pattern compared to patterns detected from the original source. The SplitClass ob-
fuscation technique hides the Adapter/Command, a Singleton and Decorator, and the
Similarity algorithm detects 15 State/Strategy instances. From these 15 instances,
10 instances are false positives and five are actual instances that are present. For
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Figure 38: Detected patterns using Sandmark
the Objectify obfuscation algorithm, except Factory, Template Method and Visitor
patterns, all other patterns were hidden from the detection tool as shown in Figure 39.
3.2 Design Obfuscation
The above applied obfuscation tools completes three types of obfuscation such as
control-flow to obscure flow of the program; data-flow obfuscation makes it difficult
to understand fields and layout obfuscation will split the code into separate proce-
dures. Therefore, these tools do not obfuscate structural and behavioral mechanisms
pertaining to class components of the system. Obfuscating design in a class level for
object oriented programs is very important in order to hide the internal architecture
of the software system. From our test results jarg, BebboSoft, and JavaGuard cannot
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Figure 39: Detected patterns graph using Sandmark
perform design or software obfuscation, whereas Proguard can hide two patterns (Vis-
itor and Singleton) due to additional obfuscation features such as efficient optimizing
and adding dead code. A Sandmark tool using an obfuscation algorithm Objectify
can hide a few design patterns and make pattern detection tools to detect many false
positives for SplitClass obfuscation.
Design obfuscations described in [29] are applied on structural and behavioral
characteristics of the 23 GoF design patterns. Software or design obfuscation is a
new class of obfuscation techniques that are used to obscure class level design of
object oriented programs. This obfuscation can be completed using three techniques:
class-coalescing, class-splitting, and type-hiding.
Class-coalescing is the transformation where two or more classes within the pro-
gram are replaced with a single class. At one extreme, this obfuscation can replace
all the classes with a single class making an OO program into non-OO procedural
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program.
Class-splitting is the transformation where one class is split into two or more
classes. There are important decisions that need to be made when splitting one
class. Used in addition with class-coalescing, this technique can change the program
structure.
Type-hiding uses the concept of a Java interfaces, in other words it introduces a
number of interfaces that are implemented by the existing classes to confuse reverse
engineering from understanding the program.
In the next subsections, we describe obfuscation of 12 GoF patterns by using
class-coalescing, class-splitting and type-hiding techniques. Since two techniques hide
most design patterns from pattern detection tools, for our purpose we did not use
type hiding obfuscation.
3.2.1 FactoryMethod pattern
Obfuscation of this FactoryMethod pattern is completed using class-coalescing
(removing two or more classes using single class). By removing the Factory interface,
plus its implementations, we included functionality into the Client class using a
separate createProduct methods initiate for all products. Figure 40 below shows
the Client class before and after obfuscation; we can see that before the Client class
had Factory instantiation for creating Products. But after obfuscation, there are
individual methods for each Product and these methods are used to create concrete
products.
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Figure 40: Obfuscate FactoryMethod pattern
3.2.2 AbstractFactory pattern
Class-coalescing AbstractFactory, AbstractProductA and AbstractProductB
interfaces, and implementing individual classes for each Product, use them directly
in the Client class as shown in Figure 41. For the ObfuscateAbstractFactory class
we add two functions to create ProductA and ProductB, then initiate these classes
as needed.
3.2.3 Builder pattern
Obfuscation of this pattern is completed by removing the Builder interface and
implementing individual ConcreteBuilder classes for each complex object. Fig-
ure 42 shows the obfuscated version of the Builder code for the TextConverter
example. The TextConverter converts an RTF text to an ASCII text. At this
point the TextConverter is the Builder and an RTFReader is the Director and
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Figure 41: Obfuscate AbstracFactory pattern
an ASCIIConverter is a ConcreteBuilder. To obfuscate this application, an
ASCIIConverter class and a TextConverter class are class coalesced into one class
with the name TextConvereter. The functionality of an ASCIIConverter class is im-
plemented within the TextConverter class in order to convert an RTF to an ASCII
document.
3.2.4 Adapter pattern
Obfuscation of this pattern can be completed by removing an Adaptee inter-
face and implementing an Adapter class for each request method that needs to be
implemented. An example for drawing a shape such as Line and Rectangle, to imple-
ment an Adapter pattern we should use Shape interface with abstract draw method;
Line and Rectangle class implements a Shape interface and uses an Adaptee classes
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Figure 42: Obfuscate Builder pattern
LegacyLine and LegacyRectangle as instances. Obfuscation of this pattern can be
completed by removing the Line and Rectangle interface and using objects from the
LegacyLine and LegacyRectangle classes. Obfuscation of a source level code is shown
in Figure 43, and Figure 44. Figure 43 demonstrates the removing of the Adaptor
implementation Rectangle and adding all functionality to the LegacyRectangle class.
Figure 44 shows the Client class that uses direct instantiation of the LegacyLine
and LegacyRectangle after obfuscation instead of Line and Rectangle. Some minor
modifications are implemented to the main method as shown in Figure 44.
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Figure 43: Obfuscate Adapter pattern
Figure 44: Obfuscate Adapter Client
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3.2.5 Bridge pattern
Obfuscation of this design pattern is achieved by class-coalescing of the
PersistenceImplementor interface and Persistence interface from the appli-
cation. In this pattern we see that leaving an interface (i.e., only obfuscating
one interface) will remove a Bridge pattern which will result in detecting
other patterns. Figure 45 shows the obfuscation by removing an Abstrac-
tion and Implementation interface. We see in Figure 45 Persistence and
PersistenceImplementor are removed and their functionality is added to the respec-
tive implementation, i.e., FileSystemPersistenceImp, DatabasePersistenceImp,
FileSystemPersistenceImplementor, and DatabasePersistenceImplementor
classes.
Figure 45: Obfuscate Bridge pattern
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3.2.6 Flyweight pattern
To obfuscate this pattern class-coalesce, a Soldier and SoldierFactory class
makes the pattern hide from pattern detection tools. Removing the Soldier inter-
face makes it necessary to implement all Soldier objects individually. As shown in
Figure 46 SoldierImp1, and SoldierImp2 are the two soldier classes needed to im-
plement all soldier objects. Implementing the number of classes for a Wargame will
increase the total number of classes and require a large amount of memory. We can
see after obfuscation, the SoldierClient class has objects from SoldierImp1, and
SoldierImp2.
Figure 46: Obfuscate Flyweight pattern
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3.2.7 Decorator pattern
Obfuscation of a decorator pattern can be achieved by class-coalescing a Win-
dow interface from the application and designing each decorator window individually.
Within the client class you need to create each object statically in order to hide the
decorator pattern. Obfuscation showing client class and other Windows implementa-
tions are shown in Figure 47. A GUIDriver client class initiates a ScrollableWindow
class without defining a super object DecoratorWindow class; we can determine that
a Windows interface is class coalesced from the Decorator pattern.
Figure 47: Obfuscate Decorator pattern
3.2.8 Mediator pattern
Obfuscation of a mediator pattern can be achieved using classcoalescing (re-
moving Mediator Interface) from the project. We need to replace Mediator
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references to respective mediator implementations. For this example it should
be ApplicationMediator, Figure 48 shows the obfuscation of the Mediator
pattern through its source code; a Mediator interface is removed, and an
ApplicationMediator is implemented as an ordinary class with all the implemen-
tation. This ApplicationMediator is to be instantiated into a Colleague class;
all Mediators must be implemented and be used in respective Colleague classes by
instantiating.
Figure 48: Obfuscate Mediator pattern
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3.2.9 Observer pattern
Class-coalescing obfuscation is used for hiding the Observer pattern; we removed
the NewsPublisher interface and Subscriber interface and developed separate news
classes for each news type: business, sports and others. A Single subscriber class will
contain all the methods needed to update various types of subscribers such as SMS,
Email, and all other forms. In Figure 49, a NewsPublisher interface is removed and
a common NewsPublisher class is implemented that will update to all subscribers by
calling respective methods for each subscriber. A Subscriber abstract class is also
removed following the same technique and updating each subscriber using methods
such as emailUpdate and smsUpdate.
Figure 49: Obfuscate Observer pattern
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3.2.10 Strategy pattern
Obfuscation of this pattern is completed using class-coalescing of the IBehavior
interface by implementing all behaviors as methods for a Robot class. Each robot be-
havior is implemented a separate function and is called when a particular movement
is required. Obfuscation of a source is shown in Figure 50 and demonstrates that
AggressiveBehavior, DefensiveBehavior, and NormalBehavior classes, which
implement an IBehavior interface, are removed. Add methods to a Robot class such
as moveAggressiveCommand, and moveDefensiveCommand, are called in the Client
class according to the behavior needed.
Figure 50: Obfuscate Strategy pattern
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3.2.11 TemplateMethod pattern
Obfuscation of this pattern can also be completed by removing the Trip interface
and individually creating classes for each trip package. These package classes are
initiated to perform the trip as shown in Figure 51. A Trip interface is removed
from the code after obfuscation of individual Package classes are implemented and
Packages are instantiated within the client class to call a performTrip function.
Figure 51: Obfuscate TemplateMethod pattern
3.2.12 Visitor pattern
Obfuscation of the Visitor Pattern can be completed through class-coalescing
IVisitor and IVisitable interfaces from the application. Implementing all the in-
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dividual functions, with respective class related statistics in a GeneralReport class
is shown in Figure 52. We can see that the IVisitor and IVisitable interfaces
are removed; individual classes for Customer, Order, Item and GeneralReport are
implemented. Still a GeneralReport will have visit methods and Customer, Order
and Item classes will have accept methods in order to work according to the appli-
cation. This pattern is obscure by simply removing the IVisitor and IVisitable
interfaces.
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Figure 52: Obfuscate Visitor pattern
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Obfuscation techniques applied to all design patterns are listed in the Figure 53
below:
Figure 53: Obfuscate design patterns
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CHAPTER 4
Tool Implementation
In our project we implemented an obfuscation tool, DesignObfuscationEngine,
using techniques described in Chapter 3. This tool must implement class-coalescing,
class-splitting and type-hiding within the Java source code in order to hide design
patterns. An Obfuscation tool is developed using:
1. Abstract Syntax Tree (AST) Eclipse API
2. PINOT command line
3. Similarity Scoring command line to start GUI
4.0.12.1 Abstract Syntax Tree (AST) Eclipse
A tool is developed in Java using an Eclipse Abstract Syntax Tree (AST) API.
An AST API is used to create source files of the obfuscated version of patterns. An
AST is a tree representation of an abstract syntactic structure of the source code from
any programming language [46]. An Abstract Syntax Tree is the base framework for
many tools in Eclipse including refactoring, QuickFix, and QuickAssist [42]. Eclipse
IDE looks at your code using an AST as shown in Figure 54; every Java source file
is entirely represented as a tree of AST nodes. An ASTNode is the parent class of
all these nodes. Each element in a Java source file is a node; an example would be:
the node for method declarations (MethodDeclaration) and for a variable declaration
(VariableDeclarationFragment). A DesignObfuscationEngine tool uses AST nodes
to create source files.
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Figure 54: Java Model Overview [42]
4.0.12.2 PINOT Command Line
The PINOT tool does not have a GUI, therefore command pinot is used to run
the tool giving rt.jar as classpath argument and source files path. The command
used to run PINOT is:
pinot classpath pinot/lib/rt.jar <sourcePath>
This command is run using a Java program using a Runtime class from the
package org.eclipse.jdt.internal. A Method invocation statement used to run
PINOT command is:
Process p = Runtime.getRuntime().exec("pinot classpath
pinot/lib/rt.jar <SourcePath>");
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4.0.12.3 Similarity Scoring Command
A Similarity scoring tool is developed using Java language, runs through the jar
file pattern4.jar and command used to start the Similarity Scoring GUI
java -Xms32m -Xmx512m -jar pattern4.jar
and command to run a Similarity Scoring tool through a command line is
java -Xms32m -Xmx512m -jar pattern4.jar
target <sourcepath> -output <xml>
The same method invocation statement using Runtime class is used to run a
Similarity Scoring tool.
For Command line:
Process p = Runtime.getRuntime().exec("java -Xms32m -Xmx512m
-jar pattern4.jar -target j¨HotDraw-¨output jhotdraw v0 0.xml");
To start GUI:
Process p = Runtime.getRuntime().exec("java -Xms32m -Xmx512m -jar
pattern4.jar");
4.1 Design and Functionality
Designing the tool can be explained using a sequence diagram shown in Figure 55
and also briefly explaining the sequence of steps within the tool in order to complete
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total obfuscation and testing using detection tools.
As shown in the sequence diagram, the user starts the DesignObfuscationEngine
tool that first creates an obfuscated design pattern code and saves it to the system. A
DesignObfuscationEngine class uses a Compiler object to compile this obfuscated
code and save the binaries, followed by tests using pattern detection tools through a
RunCommand object. Then results from both detection tools will be displayed on the
users computer screen.
Figure 55: Sequence diagram DesignObfuscationEngine
Functionality of a DesignObfuscationEngine tool can be explained in three steps:
1. Obfuscate example programs that use 23 GoF design patterns
2. Compiles these obfuscated source program to get class files
3. Run pattern detection tools PINOT and Similarity Scoring
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A DesignObfuscationEngine first creates obfuscated Java source files of example
programs that use 23 GoF patterns using an Eclipse AST, code in order to generate
a Product class file. Obfuscated source files are placed under respective packages
and all source files are stored at a known location. In the next step, these files are
compiled using a Compiler class from an org.eclipse.jdt.internal package. After
successful compilation, PINOT tool is run on the source files using pinot command
programmatically and then a Similarity Scoring tool is run in a similar way as PINOT.
A Block diagram of the obfuscation tool is shown in Figure 56.
Figure 56: Block diagram DesignObfuscationEngine
4.2 Implementation Platform
The DesignObfuscationEngine is developed in Java SDK v1.7.0 revision 3 us-
ing Eclipse AST on Windows OS. An IDE used for development is Eclipse v3.6.2
with necessary plugins installed. A Similarity scoring pattern detection tool works on
Windows and Linux OS, whereas the PINOT tool was developed to work on Linux or
any UNIX based systems. Therefore, a developed DesignObfuscationEngine must be
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platform independent and able to run on machines with Linux OS. The DesignOb-
fuscationEngine is implemented using Java to make it platform independent in order
to run both pattern detection tools.
4.3 Program Flow
Basic working and functionality of the DesignObfuscationEngine are explained
till now. This section of the report explains the flow of the program using Figure 57.
Running the tool starts DesignObfuscationEngine class that will initially create
Java source files and that are stored in known location. Then Compiler class will
be delegated and used to compile these source files, the class files are also stored in
known location. These Java source and class files are used by RunCommand object
to run PINOT command for source files and SimilarityScoring command for class
files. The pattern detection results from PINOT are shown on command prompt and
Similarity Scoring results are given as XML file.
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Figure 57: Program flow DesignObfuscationEngine
Code snippets for creating obfuscated files are shown below with a brief expla-
nation of its working:
For creating any Java source file first we need to instantiate a language parser
for creating an abstract syntax tree (ASTs) as it decodes the parameter of a language
specification (JLS2). This parser is used to create a CompilationUnit as shown in
Figure 58 below.
Figure 58: Create AST and CompilationUnit
A CompilationUnit contains elements that need to be opened before they
can be navigated or manipulated. The children of a CompilationUnit are a type
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of PackageDeclaration that declares Packages as shown in Figure 59 and an
ImportDeclaratoin is for importing necessary packages.
Figure 59: Create Import and Package Declaration
A TypeDeclaration and MethodDeclaration are classes used to define class and
declare methods, respectively, as shown in Figure 60 below. A MethodDeclaration
class contains methods such as setConstructor and setModifier in order to create
methods as needed.
Figure 60: Class and Method declaration
The instance and local variables in a class are created using a
VariableDeclarationFragment class applied to the CompilationUnit. A
SingleVariableDeclaration is used to create parameters for the methods added
to the class. These two classes can be instantiated as shown in Figure 61 below.
Figure 61: Variable and Parameter declaration
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These child classes are added to a CompilationUnit, and these statements were
placed in the order they were added to the CompilationUnit. These classes taken
from the package org.eclipse.jdt.core.dom, were used to add different types of
statements, such as assignments, and method invocations for developing our tool.
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CHAPTER 5
Results and Observations
Obfuscated design pattern tools were scored using two pattern detection tools
PINOT and Similarity Scoring. Results from each tool will be discussed separately:
5.1 Test of 23 GoF patterns
Similarity Scoring:
The Similarity scoring tool obtains input .class files, and was unable to detect
any design information from the obfuscated source generated using the DesignOb-
fuscationEngine tool. Results of the pattern detection tool are shown in Figure 62.
This figure demonstrates that no patterns were detected through a Similarity Scor-
ing, and the design is completely obfuscated from the Similarity algorithm. This
similarity algorithm depends on the class information retrieved from the Java class
files and uses this information to create Association and generalization graphs. With
class-coalescing and class-splitting applied to the design patterns, finding an exact
class relationship that matches known graphs is difficult. These also result in no or
fewer edges connected within the graph. These graphs are not scored to match known
scores. This result in poor similarity score and concludes in no exact matches within
any given patterns were discovered.
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Figure 62: Detected patterns with Obufscation
PINOT:
The PINOT tool runs pattern detection with the source code of the obfuscated
design patterns. The PINOT tool was unable to detect patterns, for most of the
design patterns, within the source. For patterns that include more abstractions such
as Visitor, Bridge, Command, Chain of Responbility (CoR ) we need to remove all
abstractions in order to hide patterns. Figure 62 shows the results from running the
PINOT tool on the obfuscated design pattern source. Results show that it still detects
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one Facade, Proxy, TemplateMethod, and CoR pattern that are false positives. There
were four false positives, detected as a Mediator pattern. These two observer patterns
are false positives that are detected Visitor patterns shown as Observer patterns.
Figure 63 below shows patterns detected on obfuscated design patterns for
PINOT and Similarity scoring tools.
Figure 63: Detected patterns graph with Obufscation
5.1.1 Runtime Analysis
The runtime analysis of obfuscated design patterns demonstrates faster execution
times when compared to normal design patterns. This increase in execution time
is expected due to a class-coalescing mechanism applied to most of the patterns.
In class-coalescing obfuscation, we replace two or more classes with one class; this
technique will reduce instantiation of two or more objects and improves the runtime
of obfuscated design patterns. Runtime analysis of a large software application will
be affected due to class-coalescing; but when only applied to the design patterns
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source, it demonstrated an improved runtime in most cases. The running time of
each pattern, before and after obfuscation, is shown in Figure 64 and Figure 65
graphs the compared runtime.
Figure 64: Runtime Analysis for Normal and Obfuscated patterns
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Figure 65: Runtime analysis graph
5.2 Tests on Grand GoF patterns from [26]
Further application testing for GoF patterns from the Patterns in Java book is
needed; these patterns are developed using object oriented structures such as inner
classes, multilevel inheritance, including multi-patterns such as Composite and Tem-
plateMethod patterns that are present in most of the patterns. Patterns detected
using PINOT and Similarity scoring for these patterns are shown in Figure 66 and
Figure 67.
Once these patterns are obfuscated using the proposed tool, we can see that
patterns are hidden from a Similarity scoring tool; with the exception of one false
positive: Prototype pattern. The PINOT tool that uses a source code for detecting
patterns can detect a few patterns that are not obfuscated, since our tool does not
obfuscate inner classes, multilevel inheritances, and multiple patterns inside a single
source. PINOT also detects patterns through method invocation details from ob-
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Figure 66: Detected patterns without Obfuscation
jects, as does Singleton pattern getInstance() (even after obscuring method name)
method. The number of detected patterns through PINOT and Similarity scoring
after obfuscation is shown in Figure 68 and Figure 69.
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Figure 67: Detected patterns without obfuscation graph
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Figure 68: Detected patterns with Obfuscation
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Figure 69: Detected patterns with obfuscation graph
5.3 Tests for Vince Huston patterns [44]
The design patterns from Vince Hustons website also use high object orientation
structures with the addition of an interface for several implementations and multilevel
inheritance. These patterns also have multipatterns, i.e., pattern within patterns.
Detection of patterns, without obfuscation of Hustons patterns is shown in Figure 70
and Figure 71.
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Figure 70: Detected patterns without Obfuscation
Obfuscation of these patterns demonstrates false positives for PINOT and a
Similarity scoring technique can detect a false positive template method. Detection
of patterns with is shown in Figure 72 and Figure 73.
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Figure 71: Detected patterns without obfuscation graph
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Figure 72: Detected patterns with Obfuscation
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Figure 73: Detected patterns with obfuscation graph
5.4 Observations
These pattern detection tools use different techniques for analyzing source or
class files. The Similarity scoring algorithm uses a symmetry scoring approach that
was unable to detect patterns from the obfuscated class files. The PINOT tool collects
information from blocks such as class hierarchies, method invocations, and relation-
ships between classes. This information is analyzed through a behavior mechanism
or examined for related patterns, as well as structural aspects used to detect pat-
terns. As PINOT gathers all this information, it finds relationship between classes
that matches patterns and sometimes arrives at a false positive. Results from present
tests demonstrated that PINOT detects false positives even after implementing class-
coalescing and class-splitting obfuscation.
The proposed tool must be extended in order to work on the source code adding
more complex object oriented structures such as inner classes, multilevel inheritance,
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and codes with more abstractions. Tests on patterns from Patterns in Java, demon-
strates that patterns with complex structures cannot be completely obfuscated. The
present obfuscator cannot perform a complete obfuscation and should be extended to
work on different cases.
5.5 Comparison to Proguard and Sandmark
In this section we shall compare pattern detection results for the obfuscate
patterns from available obfuscators Proguard, and Sandmark to DesignObfuscatio-
nEngine. Figure 74 & Figure 75 show graphs of detected patterns from these three
obfuscators.
Figure 74: Patterns for Proguard and DesignObfuscationEngine
Firstly comparing patterns detected using PINOT detection tool, Figure 74,
demonstrates using Proguard obfuscated code can hide three patterns Singleton,
Adapter, and CoR patterns. The obfuscated source from the DesignObfuscatio-
nEngine obscures all patterns, and the detected patterns are false positives.
97
Figure 75: Patterns for Proguard, Sandmark and DesignObfuscationEngine
A comparison using the Similarity scoring detection tool are given in Figure 75,
this demonstrates that obfuscation, using Proguard and Sandmark can hide few design
patterns. However, the DesignObfuscationEngine completely obscure design patterns
from the Similarity scoring tool.
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CHAPTER 6
Conclusion and Future Work
Reverse engineering Java applications are simple as binaries will be in bytecode
that represent an intermediate symbols between program and machine code. With
just a little knowledge regarding the use of bytecode anyone can easily understand
details of code such as method, field names, and additional architecture related infor-
mation. Binaries reverse engineering gives unauthorized access to source code order-
ing in understanding the architecture and internal structure of a given application.
In 2008, the reported loss to the software industry due to software piracy in general
was $47.809 billion (Business Software Alliance, May 2008). This loss increased to
$51.41 billion by May 2010 (Business Software Alliance, May 2010) [8] and for 2011
that loss is expected to be more than $59 billion. Creating a tool or mechanism that
can eradicate reverse engineering is needed, although we cannot completely stop re-
verse engineering, we can develop tools that obfuscates binaries in order to consume
a reverse engineer’s time and while not revealing the details of the software.
Obfuscation of the software binary, using available obfuscation tools such as
jarg, bb mug, JavaGuard, do obscure binaries. Well-known tools such as Proguard
and Sandmark, use many features to obfuscate code such as inserting dead code,
and layout obfuscation. Obfuscation, using these tools can hide patterns and cause
detection tools to detect false positives. These tools follow three types of obfuscation
control-flow, data obfuscation, and layout obfuscation. Three obfuscation types can-
not totally obscure the design of the softwares binary code, as it is easy for detection
tools to still detect patterns [29].
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In our project, we defined a tool that obfuscates the 23 GoF design patterns and
analyzed it for obfuscation. Design obfuscation techniques from [29], class-coalescing,
class-splitting, and type-hiding are used for obfuscation. This prototype tool is able to
obfuscate different example programs that are designed using 23 design patterns. The
obfuscation mechanisms are applied to patterns such that minimum modifications are
needed; these modifications include removing interface abstractions from the patterns
and adding some methods to implement these functions. The obfuscated patterns are
examined using both tools and the results show improved obfuscation over available
obfuscation tools. The PINOT tool detects false positives and no patterns are de-
tected for the Similarity scoring detection. One main observation is to remove all
abstractions within a software package so that pattern detection would be difficult.
In order to hide the design or internal architecture from detection tools, we need to
remove or combine all abstractions from software binaries.
Testing the proposed tool by using patterns and object oriented approaches,
such as inner classes, multilevel inheritance, using multiple patterns in single code,
and blocks of code can break the present obfuscator tool. As shown in Section 5.1,
there are patterns detected using PINOT after obfuscation. For future work, this
prototype tool should be extended to work on complex object oriented approaches.
The current prototype tool can be used as base work and applied to binaries
or packages. Future work for this tool would be to test an obfuscated source from
our prototype tool on other available pattern detection tools. Functionality can be
extended to work on medium-to-large Java binaries. In order to add and create
functions for each Product in Factory pattern for Factory class; the problem is to
search for Products required, and then create functions in Client for initializing
each Product. This is just one approach to create obfuscated code for extending the
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proposed tool.
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